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Abstract 
Liberal multicultural theories developed in late twenty-first century aims to ensure the rights of the minorities, social 
justice and harmony in liberal societies. Will Kymlicka is the leading philosopher in this field. He advocates minor-
ity rights, their autonomy and the way minority groups can be accommodated in a liberal society with their distinct 
cultural identity. Besides him, there are other political theorists on the track and Galston is one of them. He disagrees 
with Kymlicka on some crucial points, particularly regarding the scope of civil rights of the minority groups and the 
responsibilities of both majority and minority groups for the sake of social harmony and justice. He tries to develop a 
moral theory of mutualism based on inter-community toleration and constitutionalism. Considering toleration as one 
of the fundamental liberal virtues he contends that the majority government has the responsibility to make arrange-
ment both for the members of majority and minority groups so that they can build inter personal relation and learn 
toleration. The paper critically justifies the feasibility of his theory in a liberal society and claims that although Galston’s 
theory has a higher possibility to be accommodated in liberal societies, it eventually fails.
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Background
In discussing how liberal-democratic States ought to 
relate to non-liberal cultural minorities within their juris-
diction, liberals are divided into two camps. Some liberals 
argue that the liberal State should be maximally tolerant 
of different ways of life even of those that are deeply illib-
eral. Other liberals think that liberal democracy is itself 
the political expression of a valuable way of life with a 
distinctive set of values and virtues and that the liberal 
state is entitled, even obliged, to encourage its non-liberal 
minorities to accept liberal values in order to protect the 
cultural underpinnings that are essential to the flourish-
ing of liberal political institutions.
Galston argues for the priority of toleration over individ-
ual autonomy in the liberal schedule of values (Crowder 
2004). According to him, the problem with autonomy-cen-
tric liberalism is that it stands for one particular under-
standing of the human good, and so is too narrow for the 
legitimate diversity of lives to be found in a modern soci-
ety. That diversity includes outlooks that ‘cannot conscien-
tiously embrace the Enlightenment impulse’ (2002, pp. 
25–26). An attempt to use State power to promote 
individual autonomy can weaken or undermine individu-
als and groups that do not and cannot organize their affairs 
in accordance with that value without undermining the 
deepest sources of their identity (Galston 1995, p. 525). 
Autonomy-centric liberalism not only fails to properly 
respect individuals with non-liberal ideals, Galston argues, 
if liberals insist on promoting the ideal of autonomy in all 
spheres of society, they risk alienating ‘many citizens of 
goodwill’ and creating opponents in place of allies (2002, p. 
26). In this paper I argue in favor of my claim that since 
Galston’s theory provides a promising approach to social 
and political justice, peace and human rights in a plural 
society, his liberal pluralism has a higher potentiality to be 
a guiding political theory in liberal society.1 I also defend 
my other claim that the theory eventually fails.
Galston’s theory of liberal pluralism
Galston’s theory of multiculturalism encompasses his 
conception regarding diversity, expressive liberty, tolera-
tion and mutualism within a liberal framework. Galston 
1 Galston himself did not use this term for his theory. However, I think his 
theory counts as a theory of liberal multiculturalism. It is liberal because, 
as we will see, it subscribes to liberal values. It is multicultural because it 
aims to show how diverse cultures and communities can exist within a lib-
eral State.
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says, “by ‘diversity’ I mean, straightforwardly, differences 
among individuals and groups over such matters as the 
nature of the good life, sources of moral authority, reason 
versus faith, and the like” (2002, p. 21). He characterizes 
diversity in a liberal society as a fact, as an instrumental 
value and as an intrinsic value.
Galston says that we must acknowledge wide diversity 
as a fact that can be significantly altered only through the 
employment of unacceptable degrees of State coercion 
and with unacceptable levels of civil strife. Using Mill’s 
(see Mill 1977) celebration of individuality, diversity can 
be defended as having instrumental value by provid-
ing individuals with many different examples of how to 
achieve a satisfying life. But diversity can also be regarded 
as an intrinsic value. For Galston, our moral universe is 
characterized by plural and conflicting values that cannot 
be harmonized in a single comprehensive way of life and 
a wide range of such goals and conceptions could serve as 
bases of worthwhile life (2002, p. 27).
Galston’s pluralism derives from his acceptance of Ber-
lin’s notion of value incommensurability: human goals are 
many, not all of them are commensurable (Berlin 1969, p. 
171). According to Berlin, “The world that we encounter 
in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with 
choices between ends equally ultimate and claims equally 
absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably 
involve the sacrifice of others”(1969, p. 168). Hence there 
is no single ultimate right answer to questions of value; 
rather a plurality of right answers derivable from a plu-
rality of values that are equally ‘ultimate’ (Crowder 1994, 
p. 294). Galston’s multiculturalism is based on the belief 
that our moral universe is characterized by plural and 
conflicting values that cannot be harmonized in a single 
comprehensive way of life. Nor can they be reduced to a 
common measure or ranked in a clear order of priority.
If the moral philosophy of pluralism is roughly cor-
rect, there is a range of indeterminacy within which 
various choices are rationally defensible though not 
rationally required. Given that no one uniquely 
rational ordering or combination of incommensura-
ble values exist, no one could ever provide a general 
valid reason, binding on all individuals, for a par-
ticular ranking or combination. Reflective policies, 
whose justifications includes the assertion that there 
is a unique rational ordering of value, therefore have 
no basis (Galston 1998a, p. 886).
Nevertheless, moral pluralism is not a form of relativ-
ism. Galston insists that there are things that are objec-
tively bad, such as the great evils of human existence, and 
they should be rejected both in individual and collective 
life. Contrarily, there are things, which are objectively 
good, such as respecting others.
Galston maintains that “properly understood liberalism 
is about the protection of diversity, not the valorization 
of choice” (1991, p. 329). In a liberal multicultural society, 
according to his view, intrinsic goods are not all political 
goods. There are heterogeneous goods: private, social, 
familial and even religious. Although these goods can 
affect the political order, they do not exist for the sake 
of politics (2002, p. 38). Moreover it is not reasonable to 
suppose that political goods always enjoy a comprehen-
sive priority over others in every context. “Moral plural-
ism lends support to the proposition that the state should 
not be regarded as all-powerful, while political pluralism 
helps define and defend the social space within which the 
heterogeneity of value can be translated into a rich vari-
ety of worthy human lives” (2002, p. 38).
He allows that the capacity of a liberal political order 
to accommodate multiple conception of the good life 
is limited. Liberalism can legitimately reject some con-
ceptions of good. Following Berlin’s notion of the ‘com-
mon moral horizon’, he thinks that certain very basic 
values must always be respected if a given society is to 
count as minimally decent (Galston 1999, 2002, p. 50). 
This account of what must be accepted in a liberal soci-
ety has implications for the relation between religion 
and politics. Some faiths do endorse a clear hierarchy 
of binding values; some are against free expression. 
On the other hand some faiths are characterized by 
internal value pluralism and are predisposed to accept 
a pluralist society. Galston also thinks that there are 
zones where value pluralism and religious beliefs 
overlap. In such situation he contends, “once the mul-
tiplicity of faiths is an irreversible fact, other consid-
erations –many themselves faith-based–come into play 
to restrict state coercion on behalf of any single faith. 
This is a kind of restraint on certain religious prac-
tices, and it may well stack the deck in favour of faiths 
that emphasize inward conscience rather than exter-
nal observance” (1998b, p. 243). Galston thus contends 
that while autonomy poses clear challenges to faith, 
the moral philosophy of value pluralism straightfor-
wardly hospitable to faith either. For example, restrict-
ing polygamy for the Muslim men in a liberal country. 
However, Galston holds that value pluralism estab-
lishes a meaningful social space for religious belief and 
practices i.e. at least those who are willing to practice 
religious beliefs, have the space to do so.
A pluralist society not only permits and encourages 
the existence of plural goods. It also has multiple sources 
of authority—individuals, parents, civil associations, 
faith-based institutions, and the state, among others—no 
one of which is dominant in all spheres, for all purposes, 
on all occasions (Galston 2004, p. 36). Galston contends 
that
Page 3 of 9Azam  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1291 
Pluralist politics is a politics of recognition rather 
than of construction. It respects the diverse spheres 
of human activity; it does not understand itself as 
creating or constituting those activities ex nihilo. 
Families are shaped by public law, but that does 
not mean that they are wholly socially constructed. 
There are complex relations of mutual impact 
between public law and faith communities, but it is 
preposterous to claim that the public sphere creates 
these communities (2006, p. 827).
He also considers that “as so many types of human 
association possess an identity not derived from the state, 
pluralist politics does not presume that the inner struc-
ture and principles of every sphere must mirror those of 
basic political institutions” (2004, p. 38). For example, 
in order to fill positions of religious authority, religious 
communities may use, without state interference, gender-
based norms that would be forbidden in businesses and 
public accommodations.
Expressive liberty
Because liberal societies allow maximum scope for diver-
sity, they are most conducive to the development of indi-
viduality. And because liberal societies rest on individual 
freedom, they tend to foster the self determination that is 
at the heart of true individuality (Galston 1988). In a lib-
eral society it is often supposed that autonomy and diver-
sity complement each other but, “… these principles do 
not always, or usually, cohere” (2002, p. 21). Rather some-
time they create conflict in different area of practical life 
such as education or free exercise of religion. For exam-
ple, in a liberal country an illiberal group may not allow 
their girls to go to school after a certain age whatever is 
the desire of the girls. Therefore, conflict arises between 
individual autonomy and a form of diversity that allows 
restriction.
Galston’s idea of liberty i.e. ‘expressive liberty’ is thus 
not the same as autonomy. By expressive liberty he 
means, “… the absence of constraints, imposed by some 
individuals on others, that make it impossible for the 
affected individuals to live their lives in ways that express 
their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning or value 
to life” (2002, p. 28). Those who exercise expressive lib-
erty may not value autonomy. “It [expressive liberty] pro-
tects the ability of individuals and groups to live in a ways 
that others would regard as unfree” (2002, p. 29). Galston 
thinks that expressive liberty is a human good that all 
societies ought to protect because its absence is an occa-
sion for misfortunes that few would willingly endure 
(2002, p. 29).
In contrast to the concept of autonomy, expressive 
liberty demands that individuals be free to identify with 
their aims and projects, not that they should think of 
them as dictated by reason or as being the best choice 
among alternatives. Expressive freedom can be pos-
sessed by an individual who lives in conformity with 
religious tradition and obeys what she regards as divine 
commands, given that it is her beliefs about the good 
that direct her life and not coercion by her parents or her 
church. Expressive freedom does not have to be realized 
through free choice. For Galston,
Not all sets of practices will themselves rest on, or 
reflect a preference for, liberty as ordinarily under-
stood. For example, being Jewish is not always 
(indeed is not usually) a matter of choice. But once 
that fact is established through birth and circum-
stance, it becomes a matter of great importance for 
Jews to live in a society that permits them to live in 
accordance with their understanding of an identity 
that is given rather than chosen, and that typically is 
structured by commandments whose binding power 
does not depend on individual acceptance (1998a, p. 
877)
Since it is expressive liberty rather than autonomy that 
is central to a liberal pluralist State, this must be reflected 
in its institutions and the education it gives to it’s citizens. 
A liberal pluralist government may legitimately engage in 
civic education but this must be carefully restricted to 
the virtues and competences that citizens need to fulfill 
diverse roles in a liberal pluralist economy, society, and 
polity. A liberal pluralist State has a legitimate and com-
pelling interest in ensuring that the convictions, com-
petences, and virtues required for liberal citizenship are 
widely shared. Expressive liberty is possible only within 
societies whose members do not impede one another’s 
opportunity to live their lives as they see fit (Galston 
2002, p. 28). Galston contends, “Expressive liberty has 
civic preconditions—in particular, internalized norms 
of self-restraint when faced with practices that reflect 
understandings of the good life one does not share. Fos-
tering this self-restraint is (within limits) a legitimate 
object of State action” (2002, p. 29).
Toleration
Galston thinks that a central task of the liberal State is 
‘accepting and managing diversity through mutual tolera-
tion’. The maintenance of a society that accepts diversity 
and expressive freedom requires the virtue of toleration. 
This virtue does not require the belief that every per-
sonal choice, every life-plan, is equally good, and hence 
beyond rational scrutiny and criticism. Toleration is fully 
compatible with the conviction that some ways of life are 
superior to others. It does not require an easy relativism 
about the good. It is compatible with engaged moral criti-
cism of those with whom one differs. Toleration means, 
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rather, a principled refusal to use coercive power to 
impose one’s own views on others, and therefore a com-
mitment to moral competition through recruitment and 
persuasion alone (Galston 2002, p. 126). Indeed, tolera-
tion may be defined as the ability to make this conviction 
effective as a maxim of personal conduct (1988, p. 1282).
Toleration is conscientious reluctance to act in ways 
that impede others from living in accordance with their 
conception of what gives life meaning is necessary for 
expressive liberty. It is a precondition of a society which 
is able to accommodate diversity limited only by the min-
imum requirements of civic unity. But citizens cannot 
be expected to be naturally tolerant. It is thus important 
that the government of a liberal society take the initiative 
to develop it through education and in civic life. Since 
it is hard to believe that toleration, so understood, can 
be cultivated without at least minimal awareness of the 
existence and nature of ways of life other than those of 
one’s family and community, the State may act to ensure 
that people acquire this knowledge. What it may not do 
is prescribe curricula or pedagogic practices that aim to 
make students skeptical or critical of their own way of 
life (Galston 1995, p. 127). He thinks that civic education 
conducted in a multiculturalism spirit will be robust but 
carefully restricted to essentials (2002, p. 126).
Mutualism
One of the fundamental challenges in a multicultural lib-
eral democracy is discovering a way to tie people of dif-
ferent faiths and ethnicity together as members of a 
common society.2 In Galston’s theory this is accom-
plished by what he calls mutualism. By ‘mutualism’ he 
means a moral outlook that underpins a society as an 
association of individuals for mutual advantage, along 
with an understanding of mutual responsibility—individ-
ual and social—that flows from this conception (2003, p. 
212). Mutualism supports political and economic institu-
tions to which citizens contribute if they can and social 
provision for those who cannot. It endorses equality of 
opportunity that is more than formal but does not 
require equal outcomes. It promotes a limited but robust 
sense of shared fate. According to Galston, the idea of 
mutualism also insists that individuals are linked through 
a dense network of natural duties and that societies exist 
in part to give force to these duties. Human beings are 
both separated and connected, and any viable conception 
of human society must give due expression to both these 
aspects of our existence (2005, p. 167). According to him 
2 By “liberal democracy” Galston means a form of political organization in 
which individual and associational rights limit the scope of legitimate gov-
ernmental authority and the powers of democratic majorities.
if both individual and collective responsibility are under-
stood broadly, we get a State whose guiding principle is 
reciprocity. This principle is the heart of the mutualist 
alternative.
Galston thinks that within a pluralist framework secur-
ing a viable political community must satisfy precondi-
tions: there must be public order of a minimum kind, the 
rule of law and common membership in a political com-
munity. For Galston, public order of a minimum kind 
must be maintained. Pluralists recognize that anarchy 
is the enemy of pluralism. To have a stable society is it 
necessary to have and enforce stable property relations. 
The rule of law must prevail and the economy must not 
divide the population permanently between a thin stra-
tum of the rich and the numerous poor. Citizens must 
have a sense of membership in their political commu-
nity strong enough to override ethical and religious dif-
ferences (Galston 2002, pp. 65–66). Galston holds that 
public institutions are necessary to create a secure space 
within which individuals and groups may lead their lives 
in accordance with their diverse understanding of what 
gives life meaning and value and that it is justified for the 
government and citizens to ensure that this space exists.
Like Rawls (1993, 1999) Galston believes that a viable 
political society requires a shared conception of justice. 
But this shared conception must be as accommodating as 
possible. The liberal pluralist notion of justice has four 
basic elements: (a) the rule of the law, (b) equal citizen-
ship (c) public dialogue for determining the issues of 
equality, need, choice etc., and (d) enjoyment of social 
minimum as far as resources are concerned.3 How these 
elements should be spelled out depends on a particular 
polity and its history. For example, a particular political 
society may decide to guarantee to individuals more than 
the social minimum. But “there is no general theory that 
obliges particular communities to resolve such matters in 
a uniform fashion; there is wide scope for legitimate vari-
ation, guided by public preferences articulated in public 
choices. Liberal pluralist justice shapes politics not 
replaces it” (Galston 2002, p. 128).
In a mutualist multicultural society citizens have equal 
rights and responsibilities. They not only have a duty to 
uphold the law. They must also contribute to fulfilling the 
3 Liberal pluralists are committed to a conception of need that allows indi-
viduals to ward off the great evils of the human condition; what counts is 
relative to specific public purposes to which individual political communi-
ties give priority at particular moments in their history; every community 
builds an elements of choice or exchange into its understanding of distribu-
tive justice, and every community embeds choice within publicly defined 
limits; it is communities which must decide how to define the claims of 
equality with broader limits, however, from a liberal pluralists point of view-
members of community must enjoy an equal social minimum that allows 
them to meet basic needs and participate in the activities of citizenship 
(Galston 2002, pp. 129–131).
Page 5 of 9Azam  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1291 
purposes for which the society was formed. But Galston 
wants to make room for groups that do not share this 
common purpose—so long as they are willing to obey the 
law. He says that
…the stress on shared citizenship as the basis of pub-
lic norm enforceable against groups raises the possi-
bility of some intermediate status … for groups that 
are willing to abide by the basic laws of the commu-
nity without making full claims upon it, in return for 
which they might be exempted from some require-
ments of full citizenship (2002, p. 127).
It is permitted for members of groups to withdraw sub-
stantially from the civic community in order to live out 
a distinctive vision of the good life shared by few others, 
so long as this vision does not involve gross violations of 
human rights like slavery or human sacrifice (Spinner-
Halev 1999, pp. 65–86). Galston thus allows for groups 
who reject liberalism altogether—though they too are 
required to have a minimum civic education that encour-
ages toleration and mutual respect.
Justification of Galston’s liberal pluralism
There are two untwined aspects of Galston’s pluralism. 
On the one hand as a positive aspect it seems to have a 
higher capability to be a potentially viable theory in lib-
eral countries to lessen injustice and uphold the rights 
and status of the minority groups through developing 
inter-personal relation and mutualism based on tolera-
tion and respect. In this perspective Galston’s theory is 
in a better position than that of Kymlicka. However, 
there are at least two crucial limitations of the theory, 
which make it vulnerable in getting acknowledgment as a 
potentially most promising theory of pluralism.
Analysis of the first claim
First claim that is to be sought to analyze here is how 
Galston’s pluralism is more accommodative and have 
higher potentiality to ensure stability in a liberal society 
than Kymlicka. Kymlicka (1995) in his liberal multicul-
turalism prescribes various kinds of rights for minor-
ity groups without abandoning liberal values of liberty, 
equality, toleration and government neutrality. He thinks 
that a liberal society should promote autonomy and that 
non-liberal cultures should be encouraged to value indi-
vidual choice and rational critique. He also argues for the 
differentiated rights of the minorities of different types; 
natural minorities, ethnic minorities and immigrant 
minorities. He contends that justice can be prevailed if 
the autonomy of individuals can be respected as well as 
everyone’s culture-bound share can be distributed fairly. 
However, Kymlicka’s theory has its weaknesses. For one 
thing, his emphasis on the value of individual autonomy 
makes it difficult for his theory to adequately deal with 
groups that do not value individual autonomy.
Galston contends that a liberal State that valorizes 
autonomy cannot properly accommodate plurality. 
Accommodating pluralism requires accommodating those 
who do not value autonomy. As in the case of all advocates 
of liberalism, there are limits to what he thinks a liberal 
State can tolerate. But for him the purposes of liberal State 
do not include the promotion of autonomy or of more 
egalitarian forms of equality. The purpose of protecting 
human life and the normal development of basic physi-
cal and psychological capacities give it an entitlement to 
intervene in practices that threaten individuals with seri-
ous harm. The task of ensuring that citizens are able to 
participate in the society, politics and economy give it the 
justification for promoting forms of education that enable 
‘social rationality’ and prohibiting those that undermine 
it. But fulfilling these purposes would not justify a liberal 
State in interfering with a group simply because it does not 
value individual autonomy or subscribe to egalitarian ideas 
of justice. Galston thinks liberalization is likely to turn out 
to be the cultural equivalent of the Vietnam-era principle 
of destroying the village in order to save it (2002).
Galston also rejects another controversial aspect of 
Kymlicka’s theory regarding differential rights for com-
munities of different kinds. He is not interested in the 
reasons why groups want to adhere to their values or how 
groups came to be in the country in the first place. What 
is important to him is simply that people do have diverse 
values that are centrally important to their lives. On the 
other hand he is centrally concerned with how people 
with these diverse values can live together in a political 
society. His emphasis on civic education and toleration 
are important aspects of his multiculturalism.
The beauty and distinctness of Galston’s pluralism is 
that it speaks about expressive liberty rather than mere 
autonomy, it speaks about toleration as founding prin-
ciple for social and political stability in a plural society, 
it urges for the promotion of liberal virtue and unknown 
virtues lying in non-liberal community through educa-
tion and associations both institutional and non-insti-
tutional ways, and above all it tries to reconcile between 
duties and responsibilities of every citizen irrespective of 
her cultural identity. Galston also thinks that there could 
be something alternative to democracy. Such an idea is 
novel and an addition to any other theory of multicultur-
alism. According to Galston, mutualism could exist in a 
non-democratic country providing that toleration and 
the rule of law prevails. Galston, centrally concerned with 
citizenship in a diverse society and how toleration can 
be promoted, advocates a liberal society that is capable 
of encompassing diversity—including people and groups 
who do not value autonomy.
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Analysis of the second claim
Although Galston’s pluralism has a higher potentiality to 
be accommodated in a liberal society, it has two major 
limitations among others because of which it becomes 
vulnerable to be the most promising theory of multicul-
turalism. Two such problems are its failure to address 
historical injustices and to adequately secure political 
participation of minority groups.
The issue of historical injustice is one of the major 
factors of social anarchy. ‘… redressing past wrongs is 
essential to establishing conditions of justice in a society 
scarred by the enduring and pervasive effects of those 
wrongs’ (De Greiff 2003; Torpey 2003). The past injustices 
done to the minority individuals and groups are mainly 
political violence, an institutional way of undermining 
the equal worth of persons because of their ethnicity, 
religion, culture or political belief and action. As a per-
son or victim she can be targeted more than one of these 
characteristics at once (see Jones 2004, pp. 2–10). Such 
wrongdoing as political violence disrupts the fundamen-
tal moral premises of a liberal democracy because liberal 
democratic institutions have to ensure that citizens are 
treated as persons with equal moral worth. According to 
Rawls, a liberal democracy should be understood as a sys-
tem of social cooperation between free and equal persons 
(Rawls 1971). Thus respect for people’s moral equality is 
important as an intrinsic feature of a system of coopera-
tion for it to count as liberal and democratic. It is to be 
mentioned that being a victim of political violence has 
severe effects on people’s capacity to achieve a healthy 
psychological adjustment as well as to develop a life plan 
successfully. It might have similar severe affect on victim-
ized groups. Such psychological state is termed as “politi-
cal trauma”. This psychological trauma sometimes ended 
as non-cooperation, distrust, unwillingness to be accom-
modated, and isolation from the mainstream public life. 
Such past wrongdoing also demoralize the self-respect 
of persons which eventually impact on respect for others 
and mutual respect.
Study reveals that testimony is one of the ways in help-
ing the act of psychological recovery from this political 
trauma. Hamber (2009), working on the post-apartheid 
cases in South Africa contends that programs, objects 
and actions of reparation in general have impact on 
citizens’ capacity for achieving a healthy psychological 
adjustment in the aftermath of political violence. These 
reparations seem to go beyond testimony:
The integral importance of reparations, remorse, res-
titutions, truth and acknowledgment to victims […] 
I have found that reparations by victims and survi-
vors in process aimed at achieving such elusive goals 
as truth and justice is an important component of 
healing—many survivors want to feel they are tak-
ing some actions, even if they know it will not deliver 
complete justice or absolute truth. This gives survi-
vors some control over their environment, something 
which political trauma normally overrides (Hamber 
2009, p. 194).
By considering the importance of the rectification of his-
torical injustice in such empirical way, there might have 
sufficient reasons to think such past injustice as one of the 
bases of individuals’ deficit in self-respect. Rawls refers to 
the social bases of self-respect as ‘perhaps the most impor-
tant primary good’ (Rawls 1971, p. 386). This self-respect 
have four elements which make the person as a moral 
worth; a positive evaluation of herself, valuing her equal 
moral status with regard to the rest, the person must try to 
realize the system of ends that she adopts, and non-deval-
uation of her equal moral status and her own life plan by 
others (Vaca Paniagua 2012, p. 30). In case if one of these 
elements is agitated, her self-respect falls in deficit.
It is considered that a ‘past’ of a State shaped by politi-
cal violence endures an extremely high importance to 
citizens and liberal societies particularly in relation to cit-
izens’ psychology and self-respect, their mutual respect, 
and society’s liberal integrity as well as the achievement 
of social stability. Historical injustice not only affects 
victims’ psychology and self-respect but also the mutual 
respect that citizens owe to each other in social interac-
tions. In this sense, a historical wrongdoing follows the 
description given by Thomas Scanlon regarding two dif-
ferent ‘evils’ that an unjust inequality might create. He 
says,
It is an evil to be treated as inferior” […] The experi-
ential evil involved here can be characterized in sev-
eral different ways […] Let me distinguish two broad 
categories. The first, more “individualistic”, charac-
terization emphasizes what might be called dam-
age to individuals’ sense of self-worth: such things as 
feelings of inferiority and even shame resulting from 
the belief that one’s life, abilities and accomplish-
ments lack worth or are greatly inferior to those of 
others. The second category emphasizes damage to 
the bonds between people: what might be called the 
loss of fraternity resulting from great differences in 
material circumstances, accomplishments and the 
social importance according to them.(Scanlon 2003, 
p. 212)
Scanlon’s description of evils produced through unjust 
inequality is quite significant. While the first evil relates 
to the damage perpetrated on the self-respect of the 
person affected by the inequality, the second does the 
same to the relation between that person and the rest. 
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According to the dependency thesis of Bird it can be 
assumed that deficit in mutual respect is conditioned 
with self-respect i.e. if there is deficit in self respect there 
will be deficit in mutual respect (Bird 2010, p. 17). The 
deficit in mutual respect eventually affects social integrity 
and social cohesion in a liberal country. Therefore histor-
ical injustice has to be rectified in an acceptable manner 
e.g. recognition, retribution, compensation and verbal 
apology etc.
Galston has little to say about the resentments that 
sometimes affect group relationships. Diversity in a plu-
ral society is caused not merely by differences of value. 
It can also be caused by historical factors—particu-
larly by events that are perceived by some groups as an 
injustice committed against them (Thompson 2002; 
Spinner Halev 2007, 2001). We have seen that Galston’s 
theory tries to promote toleration, expressive liberty and 
mutual interrelation. However, among these elements 
of his pluralism, mutualism is the most promising. The 
fundamental basis of his mutualism is mutual respect, 
mutual interest and interest for the whole community. 
Non-rectification of historical injustice not only creates 
divisions but makes mutualism difficult to achieve also. 
People, suffered from oppression are not likely to think 
that they share common purposes with their oppressors. 
Moreover, such mutualism is in question when the issue 
of practical implication is taken into consideration. In 
societies, liberal or not, where there are ample of exam-
ples of historical injustices, rectification of such injustices 
might be considered as a precondition for the establish-
ment of social solidarity and justice. In a pluralist society, 
any theory of plurality or theory of minority rights need 
to address properly the issue of historical injustices done 
to the minority groups in question, however, in some 
cases immigrant minorities might not face such trauma. 
According to Streich, an apology is one way to create a 
polity in which black Americans are equal moral, civic, 
and political members from the start and to recognize 
that this equality was denied as the founding of the US 
and delayed from reconstruction to the present”(Streich 
2002, p. 541). Civic education, as Galston describes it, 
does not seem sufficient to heal wounds that have been 
caused by history.
Another problem of Galston’s pluralism ponders in 
giving minority groups’ access to decision-making body 
i.e. in politics. Though Galston advocates a plural soci-
ety in which groups can live according to their cultural 
and religious values, his conception of politics is not 
much different from that of liberals who advocate com-
mon citizenship. Full citizens are individuals with a com-
mon political standing. They have an equal responsibility 
for fulfilling liberal purposes and have equal rights as 
citizens. Galston allows for groups that don’t want to par-
ticipate in this way. But his mutualism assumes that these 
groups are very much in a minority. Like classical liber-
als he seems to assume that group allegiances, including 
religious belief, belong to private, or non-political, life 
and that in their political existence citizens participate as 
individuals. A mutualist State is a secular State and reli-
gion does not have a place in politics. This goes against 
the stance of those who think that religion should play 
a direct role in politics. But it also leads to a tension in 
Galston’s theory between giving groups such a large 
role in social life and no official role in politics. Minor-
ity groups in a liberal plural society, being deprived of a 
number of civil and political rights, often demand that 
the group itself should be represented directly in politics. 
The demand is, however, justified in some respects. For 
example, it’s problematic for the minority groups that it’s 
the majority people who decide about the life style of the 
minority group-members. For example, Jews, a minor-
ity group in USA, wants to close their shop on Saturday. 
Now if the majority who is not by religion Jews adopts a 
public policy that Saturday is not a weekly holiday, then 
its difficult for the minority Jews community to per-
form their religious and cultural commitment as a mem-
ber of that particular group. Likewise, Muslims in USA 
requires holidays on their religious festive that they are 
accustomed in their Muslim majority homeland but it’s 
the majority who can only decide whether holiday can 
be announced on those days. As a result, it’s difficult 
for them to observe the festival on that particular day 
because as there is no representative from the commu-
nity in decision-making body, the significance of the fes-
tive and its impact on the group-members remain unfelt 
by the majority groups. In the same line in a plural soci-
ety, if it’s the majority who always take decisions about 
the minority ethnic or religious groups then it might 
fail to do justice to the minority groups. Moreover, like 
any other theory of liberal pluralism or multicultural-
ism, Galston’s theory is also not different form accepting 
majoritarian democracy. In a majoritarian democracy 
the minority groups have only option to be marginal-
ized (Andeweg 2000; Arend 1986; Lijphart 1969). Galston 
speaks about many issues related to the interest of the 
minority groups such as expressive liberty, associational-
ism, mutualism, majority toleration and so. However, the 
question arises whether the majority group tolerates the 
participation of a minority representation in decision-
making body with the power to veto to any policy sub-
servient to their interest. Although this tension is not a 
serious matter in a society where secularism is accepted 
and where individualism is dominant. But it is bound to 
pose a problem in societies where group membership is 
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crucial in political as well as social life and secularism is 
not widely accepted.
The third problem of Galston’s pluralism concerns its 
success in accommodating non-liberal groups in a lib-
eral setting. The problem is based on the objection that 
there are ‘lacks of clarity about what a liberal State can 
tolerate and what it cannot’ in Galston’s theory. Galston 
makes the point that his theory of liberal pluralism 
cannot tolerate a gross violation of human rights even 
when group members regard such violations as part of 
their cultural life. For example, human sacrifice is not 
allowed even if those who are sacrificed accept this as 
a cultural norm (Galston 2002). The Aztec religion is 
out of bounds. Following Berlin, Galston argues that 
some highly generic norms are universal in the sense 
that they are mandatory for any form of life to count as 
‘minimally human, decent, and morally acceptable’. But 
Galston offers no systematic account of the contents 
of the common moral horizon. Human sacrifice is an 
extreme example and we are left to wonder about other 
practices that are not so extreme but are nevertheless 
widely condemned. Would genital mutilation of women 
be allowed in a liberal society? Would it be allowable 
for a cultural group to severely punish homosexuals? 
Moreover, Galston himself points out that religious 
group that allows for differences of opinion and accepts 
diversity will have an easier time accepting the expres-
sive liberty of others. But people who believe that their 
religion is the true religion and have a strong commit-
ment to their beliefs will have difficulty tolerating prac-
tices that go against their beliefs. The Hindus consider 
“Cow” as a goddess and they respect Cow in as such. 
Therefore it is very difficult for them to tolerate a situa-
tion in which someone from a different faith slaughters 
a Cow. Accepting others’ right to have different beliefs 
is easier than tolerating practices that hurt people’s 
sacred and holy feelings. Such problems are more seri-
ous than some issues of moral debate e.g. the opposi-
tion between pro-life people who think that abortion is 
murder and pro-choice people who think that it is not, 
because in such moral debates the choice is personal 
but in cases mentioned above the opposition is con-
nected to a group tradition and way of life. Galston’s 
mutualism depends heavily on toleration and toleration 
requires self-restraint. Indeed toleration that under-
writes a society in which people are prepared to work 
together to maintain basic structures, defines a com-
mon concept of justice and to fulfill liberal purposes is 
likely to require more than a willingness to live and let 
live. Mutual respect seems to be required. Some critics 
therefore wonder whether non-liberal groups are likely 
to accept the kind of toleration that mutualism requires 
(Crowder 2004).
Conclusion
The liberal multiculturalism of Galston fails to do jus-
tice to minorities at least in two respects. One of them is 
their failure to deal with the problem of historical injus-
tice and the other is the problem of politics. Liberal mul-
ticulturalism provides an account of justice for minority 
groups. But it pays little attention to practical politics: 
how minority groups can ensure that a government will 
treat them justly. Practically speaking, having political 
power over crucial decisions is the only guarantee (at 
least in the opinion of people in many minority groups). 
Galston thinks that groups should be able to make their 
own decision about some matters, but they have typically 
liberal ideas about citizenship. Citizens are individu-
als. Participation in minority group decision-making is 
something apart from participation in decision making 
of governments. Groups themselves do not participate 
in political decision making of the State. This means that 
minority groups can still be at a disadvantage if political 
decisions go against them—if the State is not prepared 
to satisfy liberal multicultural requirements of justice. 
For example, Aborigines are a small minority in Austral-
ian population and if the government decides on a policy 
that disadvantages them, there is not much they can do 
about it. Having a few seats in a parliament, without veto 
power, dedicated to minority groups is not sufficient, 
because the majority can outvote these few representa-
tives. Civic education might help—but probably not 
enough in a society where there is a lot of distrust and 
entrenched prejudices.
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